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INTRODUCTION
The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
(the ―Tobacco Control Act‖ or the ―Act‖), enacted on June 22,
2009, is anti-tobacco legislation that explicitly affects sports
and entertainment sponsorships by banning all remaining
tobacco-brand advertisements.1 This legislation, although
undoubtedly important, also raises significant constitutional
questions. The Tobacco Control Act bars—through the Food
and
Drug
Administration‘s
(FDA)
implementing
regulations2—tobacco manufacturers from promoting their
brands through sponsorship of ―athletic, musical, artistic, or
other social or cultural event[s].‖3 Although this legislation
has been said to ―serve[] as a crowning achievement of the
efforts by anti-smoking advocates to stop individuals, notably
teenagers, from starting the habit,‖4 the advertising
restrictions contained in the bill may jeopardize sponsorships
for sports and entertainment events and may be
constitutionally suspect.5
In fact, under the applicable
standard for analyzing the constitutionality of commercial
speech, the Tobacco Control Act may be found to be in
violation of the First Amendment to the United States

1. Pub. L. No. 111–31, 123 Stat. 1776 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 21 U.S.C.A.).
2. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 § 105(a)(1), 21
U.S.C.A. § 387f-1(a)(1) (2010) (―Not later than [six] months after the date of enactment
of this Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services . . . shall develop and publish a
action plan to enforce restrictions . . . on promotion and advertising of menthol and
other cigarettes to youth.‖).
3. 21 C.F.R. § 1140.34(c) (2010).
4. Mark Conrad, The New Anti-Tobacco Legislation, Sports Events and
Commercial Speech, SPORTS LAW BLOG (June 24, 2009, 11:25 AM), http://sportslaw.blogspot.com/2009/06/new-anti-tobacco-legislation-sports.html.
5. Id.
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Constitution.6
Part I of this Comment will outline the Tobacco Control
Act, focusing on the specific provisions relating to the
regulation of tobacco advertising at sports and entertainment
events as well as the goals of the legislation. Part II will
discuss the history and progress of anti-tobacco legislation
restricting advertising with a focus on the constitutional
attacks and objections raised during the hearing phase of the
Tobacco Control Act‘s ratification. Part III will discuss the
history of commercial speech protections afforded under the
First Amendment. Additionally, it will examine related case
law applying the doctrine in various contexts, and will provide
a detailed discussion of the prevailing framework for
analyzing the constitutionality of regulations on commercial
speech. Lastly, Part IV will apply the prevailing test outlined
in Part III to the Tobacco Control Act to determine the likely
result of a similar constitutional challenge brought before the
Supreme Court.
I. THE FAMILY SMOKING PREVENTION AND TOBACCO
CONTROL ACT
Under the Tobacco Control Act, Congress effectively gave
the FDA regulatory power over tobacco products.7 Although
the purpose of the Act is to help curb adolescent tobacco use, 8
the adult tobacco market will suffer as a result of these broad
regulations. The objective of the Act is primarily to prohibit
tobacco companies from marketing and advertising their
products in ways that appeal to children.9 The ―law [is] the
first big federal step against smoking since the 1971 ban
against tobacco advertising on television and radio and the

6. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (―Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the government for a redress of grievances.‖ (emphasis added)).
7. TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, FEDERAL REGULATION OF TOBACCO:
IMPACT ON STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY 1 (2009), http://publichealthlawcenter.org/
sites/default/files/fda-1.pdf .
8. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-31, § 3(2), 123 Stat. 1776, 1781 (2009).
9. See generally Emily P. Walker, House Committee Approves Bill to Give FDA
Tobacco Authority, Post to Washington Watch, MEDPAGE TODAY (Mar. 4, 2009),
http://www.medpagetoday.com/Washington-Watch/Washington-Watch/13126.
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1988 rules against smoking on airline flights.‖10 Indeed, the
Act aims to curb ―the use of tobacco by young people‖11 while
―continu[ing] to permit the sale of tobacco products to
adults.‖12 To that end, however, the Tobacco Control Act
significantly restricts the ability of tobacco producers to
manufacture
and
distribute
their
products
while
simultaneously closing the door to sports and entertainment
related tobacco sponsorships.13
A. Provisions of the Act Pertaining to Sports and
Entertainment Events
Under the Tobacco Control Act, the FDA now has ―wideranging authority to regulate tobacco product marketing,‖
including the power to implement new regulations in the
future.14 In addition to the bans in sports and entertainment,
the Act also prohibits outdoor advertising within 1000 feet of
schools and playgrounds, free giveaways of any non-tobacco
items, free samples, and the sale of cigarettes in packages
that contain fewer than twenty cigarettes.15 The Act also
limits any outdoor and all point-of-sale tobacco advertising to
black text on white background only—except in adult only
facilities—advertising in publications with significant teen
readership to black text on white background only, and audiovisual advertising to black text on white background visuals
and spoken words.16
With respect to prohibitions on sports and entertainment
events, section 102 of the Tobacco Control Act sets forth
specific provisions aimed toward the advertising of tobacco
products at these events.17 Under these provisions, the Act
bars tobacco manufacturers from promoting their brands
10. Duff Wilson, Senate Approves Tight Regulation over Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES,
June 11, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/12/business/12tobacco.html; see also
TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, supra note 7, at 2 (noting that the Tobacco
Control Act ―[r]epresents the most sweeping action taken to date‖).
11. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 § 3(2).
12. § 3(7).
13. See generally Pub. L. No. 111–31, 123 Stat. 1776 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.A.).
14. TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, supra note 7, at 17.
15. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 11131, § 102(a)(2), 123 Stat. 1776, 1830–32; 21 C.F.R. § 897.30(b)
16. § 102(a)(2), § 897.30(b).
17. § 102(a)(2)(G); 21 C.F.R. § 1140.16(d)(1), (d)(3)(A)–(B) (2010).
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through sponsorship of ―athletic, musical, artistic, or other
social or cultural event[s].‖18 These provisions also ban:
[M]anufacturer[s],
distributor[s],
[and]
retailer[s]
[from]
distribut[ing] or caus[ing] to be distributed any free samples of
cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, or other tobacco products. . . [, and]
....
manufacturer[s], distributor[s], or retailer[s] [from] distribut[ing] or
caus[ing] to be distributed any free samples of smokeless tobacco
(A) to a sports team or entertainment group; or
(B) to any football, basketball, baseball, soccer, or hockey
event or any other sporting or entertainment event
determined by the Secretary to be covered by this
subparagraph.19

The Tobacco Control Act, does not, however, ―prohibit a
manufacturer, distributor, or retailer from distributing or
causing to be distributed free samples of smokeless tobacco in
a qualified adult-only facility.‖20

18. 21 C.F.R. § 1140.34(c) (2010).
19. § 1140.16(d)(1), (d)(3)(i)–(ii); § 102(a)(2)(G)
20. § 1140.16(d)(2); § 102(a)(2)(G). For purposes of this section, the term ―qualified
adult-only facility‖ is defined as a facility or restricted area that:
(i) requires each person present to provide to a law enforcement officer
(whether on or off duty) or to a security guard licensed by a governmental
entity government-issued identification showing a photograph and at least the
minimum age established by applicable law for the purchase of smokeless
tobacco; (ii) does not sell, serve, or distribute alcohol; (iii) is not located
adjacent to or immediately across from (in any direction) a space that is used
primarily for youth-oriented marketing, promotional, or other activities; (iv) is
a temporary structure constructed, designated, and operated as a distinct
enclosed area for the purpose of distributing free samples of smokeless tobacco
in accordance with this subparagraph; and (v) is enclosed by a barrier that—
(I) is constructed of, or covered with, an opaque material (except for entrances
and exits); (II) extends from no more than 12 inches above the ground or floor
(which area at the bottom of the barrier must be covered with material that
restricts visibility but may allow airflow) to at least 8 feet above the ground or
floor (or to the ceiling); and (III) prevents persons outside the qualified adultonly facility from seeing into the qualified adult-only facility, unless they make
unreasonable efforts to do so; and (vi) does not display on its exterior—(I) any
tobacco product advertising; (II) a brand name other than in conjunction with
words for an area or enclosure to identify an adult-only facility; or (III) any
combination of words that would imply to a reasonable observer that the
manufacturer, distributor, or retailer has a sponsorship that would violate
section 897.34(c).
§ 1140.16(d)(iii)(A)–(F)(iii); § 102(a)(2)(C)(i)–(vi).
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B. Goals Purported to Be Targeted by the Tobacco Control
Act
The aim of the Tobacco Control Act is to reduce
adolescents‘ access to tobacco products and to diminish the
appeal of these products to America‘s youth.21
―The
Congressional Budget Office estimated that the new law
would reduce youth smoking by [eleven] percent and adult
smoking by [two] percent over the next decade, in addition to
reductions already achieved through other actions, like higher
taxes and smoke-free indoor space laws.‖22 The Act proposes
to achieve this end by restricting the means by which tobacco
companies advertise and market their products.23
Indeed, the drafters of the Act announced that its aim is to
―ensure that the [FDA] has the authority to address issues of
particular concern to public health officials, especially the use
of tobacco by young people and dependence on tobacco.‖ 24
Evincing the Act‘s aim of curbing the appeal of tobacco to
adolescents is its ban of all outdoor tobacco advertisements
within 1000 feet of schools and playgrounds and its bar of
colorful advertisements and store window displays in favor of
advertisements consisting solely of black and white text.25
Further bolstering the Tobacco Control Act‘s goals is
section 105 regarding the enforcement action plan for
advertising and promotion restrictions.26 Specifically, this
section mandates that a plan is to be developed and published
―to enforce restrictions . . . on [the] promotion and advertising
of menthol and other cigarettes to youth.‖27 The ―community
assistance‖ subparagraph to section 105 additionally provides
that ―[a]t the request of communities seeking assistance to
21. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec‘y, The White House, Fact Sheet: The
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 (June 22, 2009), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Fact-sheet-and-expected-attendees-fortodays-Rose-Garden-bill-signing/.
22. Wilson, supra note 10.
23. Id.; see also Walker, supra note 9 (―The FDA would also be able to prohibit
companies from advertising their products in ways that appeal to kids—such as by
adding clove or vanilla flavors —or labeling their smokes as ―light‖ or ―low tar,‖ or with
other phrases suggesting a healthier cigarette.‖).
24. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 11131, § 3(2), 123 Stat. 1776, 1781 (2009).
25. §102(a)(2); 21 C.F.R. § 897.30(b).
26. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 11131, § 105, 123 Stat. 1776, 1841 (2009).
27. § 105(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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prevent underage tobacco use, the Secretary shall provide
such assistance, including assistance with strategies to
address the prevention of underage tobacco use in
communities with a disproportionate use of menthol
cigarettes by minors.‖28 Lastly, when commenting on the
promulgation of this Act, President Obama proudly
announced that the Tobacco Control Act crowns a ―decadeslong effort to protect our children from the harmful effects of
smoking.‖29
1. Legislative Findings in Support of the Tobacco Control
Act‘s Goals
In support of the Tobacco Control Act, the 111th Congress
provided—in section two of the Act—relevant findings aimed
toward its purported goals.30 Several examples of such
findings enumerated in section two include paragraph four,
which provides that ―[v]irtually all new users of tobacco
products are under the minimum legal age to purchase such
products.‖31 In fact, ―[r]educing the use of tobacco by minors
by [fifty] percent would prevent well over 10,000,000 of
today‘s children from becoming regular, daily smokers, saving
over 3,000,000 of them from premature death due to tobaccoinduced disease.‖32
Similarly, paragraphs five and fifteen state that tobacco
advertising and marketing efforts aimed toward attracting
young people have contributed considerably to the use of
tobacco products by adolescents.33 Indeed, ―[i]n 2005, the
cigarette manufacturers spent more than $13,000,000,000 to
attract new users, retain current users, increase current
consumption, and generate favorable long-term attitudes
toward smoking and tobacco use.‖34 Importantly, paragraph
28. § 105(b)(2) (emphasis added).
29. Obama Signs Sweeping Anti-Smoking Bill, MSNBC.COM (June 22, 2009),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31481823/from/ET/.
30. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 11131, § 2, 123 Stat. 1776, 1776–81 (2009).
31. § 2(4).
32. § 2(14).
33. § 2(5), (15).
34. § 2(16); see also § 2(48) (―In August 2006 a United States district court judge
found that the major United States cigarette companies dramatically increased their
advertising and promotional spending in ways that encourage youth to start smoking
subsequent to the signing of the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) in 1998. USA v.
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nineteen states that ―[t]hrough advertisements during and
sponsorship of sporting events, tobacco has become strongly
associated with sports and has become portrayed as an
integral part of sports and the healthy lifestyle associated
with rigorous sporting activity.‖35 With respect to other forms
of entertainment, Congress posited that ―[t]he use of tobacco
products in motion pictures and other mass media glamorizes
its use for young people and encourages them to use tobacco
products.‖36
II. HISTORY OF PRIOR ANTI-TOBACCO LEGISLATION, SPORTS
RELATED RESTRICTIONS AND LITIGATION, AND
CONGRESSIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE ACT
The Tobacco Control Act is the culmination of a number of
historical developments. A review of the Act‘s antecedents
and the challenges that those legislative attempts triggered
may prove instructive to the application of the commercial
speech framework, described below, to the Tobacco Control
Act.
A. Prior Anti-Tobacco Legislation Restricting Advertising
Although tobacco products have been promoted in the
United States for over a century, it was not until the early
1960s that the government became cognizant of the health
risks associated with tobacco use.37 In 1964, the Surgeon
General released an Advisory Committee Report on Smoking
and Health that was founded on over 7000 scientific articles
that ―highlighted the deleterious health consequences of
tobacco use.‖38 The report revealed that cigarette smoking
was ―responsible for a [seventy] percent increase in the
mortality rate of smokers over non-smokers‖ and was
specifically linked with cancer and other diseases such as
bronchitis, emphysema, and coronary heart disease.39
Philip Morris, USA, Inc., et al. (Civil Action No. 99-2496 (GK), August 17, 2006)‖).
35. § 2(19).
36. § 2(21); see also § 2(1), (6), (17), (21)–(28), (47).
37. The Reports of the Surgeon General: The 1964 Report on Smoking and Health,
U.S. NAT‘L LIBR. MED., http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/retrieve/Narrative/NN/p-nid/60
(last visited Feb. 14, 2011).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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Commentators agree that this report had a significant impact
on public attitudes toward tobacco use and subsequently
enacted legislation.40 In fact, ―[a] Gallup Survey conducted in
1958 found that only [forty-four] percent of Americans
believed smoking caused cancer, while [seventy-eight] percent
believed so by 1968.‖41
In response to the Report warning that ―cigarette smoking
is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the United
States to warrant appropriate remedial action,‖ Congress
enacted a law in 1965 requiring warning labels on all
cigarette packages distributed in the United States.42 This
law—the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act43 (the
―Cigarette Labeling Act‖)—enabled Congress to assume
exclusive control over all aspects of cigarette promotion,
labeling, and advertising, essentially precluding states from
exercising any control.‖44
Shortly thereafter, Congress
announced that the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) would require all licensed television and radio to
provide ―a ‗significant amount of time‘—not equal time—to
those who sought to present the case against cigarette
smoking.‖45 Relying ―not only on the Fairness Doctrine[,] 46
but on the obligation of stations to serve the ‗public interest,‘‖
the FCC limited this promulgation ―to cigarettes, a product it
held to be uniquely dangerous.‖47 Consequently, on April 1,
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1341
(2006)).
44. Eric D. Brophy, Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health: Especially If You Are a
Sports Advertiser, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 261, 265 (1998) (citing James C. Thorton,
The Liability of Cigarette Manufacturers for Lung Cancer: An Analysis of the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act and Preemption of Strict Liability in Tort
Against Cigarette Manufacturers, 76 KY. L.J. 569, 575 (1987)).
45. Ronald Bayer, Tobacco, Commercial Speech, and Libertarian Values: The End
of the Line for Restrictions on Advertising?, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 356, 356 (Mar.
2002), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1447076.
46. Id. The FCC developed the ―Fairness Doctrine‖ which requires ―publicly
licensed television and radio stations to carry responses when they had taken positions
on matters of public controversy.‖ Id. (the ―Fairness Doctrine‖ was adopted by the FCC
in 1949 and mandated holders of broadcast licenses to present controversial issues to
the public in a way that was (in the FCC‘s mind) honest, equitable and balanced).
Accord 47 U.S.C § 301 (2006); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)
(upholding the FCC‘s general right to enforce the Fairness Doctrine where channels
were limited).
47. Bayer, supra note 45, at 356.
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1970, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act48 was signed
into law by Richard Nixon and effectively banned the
advertising of cigarettes on television and radio starting on
January 2, 1971.49
In 1984, Congress amended the Cigarette Labeling Act to
require companies to put one of four warning labels on the
cigarette containers, including:
(1) SURGEON GENERAL‘S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung
Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate
Pregnancy; (2) SURGEON GENERAL‘S WARNING: Quitting
Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health; (3)
SURGEON GENERAL‘S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant
Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low
Birth Weight; or (4) SURGEON GENERAL‘S WARNING: Cigarette
Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide.50

A few years later, the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco
Health Education Act of 198651 extended the broadcast
advertising ban to smokeless tobacco products.52
Surprisingly, in light of the onslaught of health reports
issued regarding the inherent dangers associated with tobacco
products, cancer victims did not bring a class action against
tobacco manufacturers for injuries suffered as a result of
tobacco use53 until Broin v. Philip Morris Cos.54 Following
this suit, tobacco companies had to defend themselves in a
large number of similar cases, and, in 1998, after the
culmination of a great deal of effort, these cases ended in a
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) ―involving more than
[forty-six] states and the six largest tobacco companies.‖55
48. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1339
(2006)).
49. Gene Borio, Tobacco Timeline, TOBACCO.ORG, http://www.tobacco.org/resources/
history/Tobacco_Historynotes.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2011); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1335
(―After January 1, 1971, it shall be unlawful to advertise cigarettes and little cigars on
any medium of electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the [FCC].‖).
50. Borio, supra note 49. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1341 (regarding
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act).
51. Pub. L. 99-252, 100 Stat. 330 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401 et seq.
(2006))
52. Borio, supra note 49.
53. Brophy, supra note 44, at 268–69.
54. 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (flight attendants brought suit against
tobacco producers for alleged in-flight inhalation of second hand smoke causing injury).
55. David L. Hudson, Jr., Advertising & First Amendment: Tobacco Ads, FIRST
AMENDMENT
CTR.,
http://www.firstamendmentjournal.com/speech/advertising/
topic.aspx?topic=tobacco_alcohol (last visited Feb. 12, 2011) (noting that the six largest
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Indeed, ―in the wake of insurmountable odds, the [tobacco]
industry agreed‖ to pay billions of dollars in return for
considerations, including agreements to settle nearly all
litigation between parties.56 The tobacco companies agreed to
place a number of marketing and advertising restrictions on
themselves.
Examples of these self-imposed restrictions
include the following:
A ban on tobacco companies use of cartoon characters, such as
―Joe Camel,‖ to advertise their products
A ban on targeting youth in the advertising, promotion, or
marketing of tobacco products
A ban on tobacco company sponsorships for concerts or other
events with significant youth audiences, including team
sporting events, such as football games
A ban on using tobacco brand names on stadium and arena
advertisements57

Interestingly, in response to these ―self-imposed‖ restrictions,
some commentators posited that, had these restrictions come
in the form of legislation as opposed to a settlement
agreement, they would be deemed unconstitutional.58
Lastly, in 2003, tobacco manufacturers, in conjunction
with publishers from four large magazines, agreed to ban the
placement of tobacco advertisements in school library editions
of four publications.59 These four magazines were Time,
People, Sports Illustrated, and Newsweek.60

tobacco companies involved in the agreement included: Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Co., Lorillard Tobacco, Philip Morris Companies Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
Commonwealth Tobacco and Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.); Master Settlement
Agreement, Nat‘l Ass‘n of Attorneys Gen., http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/
tobacco/msa/msa-pdf/MSA%20with%20Sig%20Pages%20and%20Exhibits.pdf/download.
56. See Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 55; Brophy, supra note 44, at
269; see also Hudson, supra note 55.
57. Hudson, supra note 55.
58. See id. (quoting Richard Samp, Chief Counsel of the Washington Legal
Foundation, stating that ―[m]any of the restrictions on advertising included in the
settlement agreement could not be imposed legislatively because they would violate the
First Amendment‖).
59. Cigarettes Advertising in U.S.A., PARLIAMENT CIGARETTES ONLINE (Mar. 31,
2009), http://the-parliament-cigarette.blogspot.com/2009_03_29_archive.html.
60. Id.
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B. Sports Advertising Restrictions and Related Litigation
Although enacted in the 1960s, tobacco companies did not
challenge the Cigarette Labeling Act until 1995 when the
Department of Justice brought its first civil suit against
Madison Square Garden for failing to remove a Marlboro sign
from the scorer‘s table.61 The owners soon agreed to remove
the advertisement, and both parties asserted that an NBA
rule required the sign‘s removal.62 The owners of Shea
Stadium defended themselves against a similar suit, seeking
removal of a Marlboro sign located below the scoreboard. 63
Shortly before the season commenced, the Mets switched the
sign with a Sharp Electronics ad and noted that the Marlboro
sign, in its new location, would ―only get[] fleeting glimpses on
[television].‖64
Litigation, however, was not limited to New York. For
example, in Michigan, the Detroit Tigers complied with
demands to remove tobacco billboards in and around the
stadium.65 Similarly, in Boston, Fenway Park ―owners were
compelled by threats of federal sanction to remove a
legendary Marlboro sign hanging above the stadium.‖66 Then,
in 1997, ―[j]ust days before Super Bowl XXXI was to take
place, the Justice Department‘s Office of Consumer Litigation
sent a letter to Philip Morris attorneys requesting removal of
[billboards containing tobacco advertisements], citing the
extensive exposure of the signs during the Sugar Bowl.‖67
Philip Morris removed the advertisements before the Justice
Department brought any legal action.68

61. Brophy, supra note 44, at 270.
62. Id.; see also Richard Sandomir, New Formations for Stadium Signs, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/07/business/new-formations-forstadium-signs.html?pagewanted=1 (―[A] courtside Marlboro sign was removed at the
beginning of the season in compliance with a new National Basketball Association
policy.‖).
63. Brophy, supra note 44, at 270.
64. Sandomir, supra note 62.
65. Brophy, supra note 44, at 270.
66. Id. at 270–71.
67. Id. at 271.
68. Id.
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C. Challenges Voiced During the Legislative Enactment
Process
During a hearing in front of the House of Representatives,
Representative Stephen Buyer expressed the following
concerns with respect to the Tobacco Control Act:
While we all agree that steps need to be taken to help lessen the
use of tobacco products by underage youth, we must not do so in
ways that clearly violate the First Amendment. Unfortunately, the
bill in front of us I believe fails to meet that test.
The speech restrictions in this bill are clearly the most sweeping
in the history of the United States for any legal product. Numerous
top legal experts from every point of the political spectrum have
looked at these provisions and declared that they will not meet
First Amendment scrutiny.
....
What we are doing in this body is two things: we are taking the
[regulations] from the 1996 rule that the Supreme Court found
unconstitutional and we are making them statutory, which means,
attention to lawyers in America: you have an access and avenue
right back to Federal Court immediately upon the President‘s
signature of this legislation.
....
In this case, it is commercial speech, and that is what we are
doing. When we take the MSA . . . and also place these restrictions
and then make them statutory, bang, we are right back to the
Supreme Court. And I just find that very bothersome.
....
. . . The paternalistic view that tobacco advertising must be
restricted because consumers might find it pervasive is antithetical
to the assumption on which the First Amendment is based.69

At the same hearing, Representative Ronald Paul added
the following:
69. 155 CONG. REC. H6630 (daily ed. June 12, 2009) (statement of Rep. Buyer), 155
Cong Rec H 6630, at *6668 (LEXIS). Accord id. at *6653 (regarding the potential
challenges to the Act, Representative Buyer stated: ―So I would say to my good friend
that as soon as this bill is signed into law, a couple of things are going to happen.
Number one, the lawyers will make a run to the Federal courts, and the Supreme Court
will be back sitting in judgment over the provisions on advertising restrictions, not only
potential unconstitutional provisions on the First Amendment with regard to the
regulation of commercial speech, but also in the Fifth Amendment with regard to
whether it‘s a constitutional taking or not‖).
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One part of this bill that I find particularly bad, but it is
pervasive in so much of what we do, about 100 years ago we took
the First Amendment and freedom of speech and chopped it into
two pieces. We have political speech. Of course we like that. We‘re
in the business of politics. But we take commercial speech, and we
put it over here, and we regulate the living daylights out of
commercial speech. That‘s not a First Amendment. That‘s
chopping freedom in half, and that just leads to more problems.
But this will lead to prohibition, and it won‘t work. This will just
give us a lot more trouble.70

The concerns voiced by these two representatives reflect
the questions many tobacco regulators have regarding the
constitutionality of restricting such commercial speech. These
constitutional questions concern whether the act satisfies the
requisite commercial speech framework articulated in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of
New York.71
III. COMMERCIAL SPEECH AUTHORITY AND THE CENTRAL
HUDSON FRAMEWORK
The specific provisions of the Tobacco Control Act that
pertain to sports and entertainment advertising are the
regulations of commercial speech. For over a quarter of a
century, the Supreme Court of the United States has
recognized that such speech is within the purview of the First
Amendment,72 with the caveat that the speech ―must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading,‖73 false, or deceptive.74
Although the Court has recognized that ―commercial speech
receives a lower level of protection than other categories of
expression,‖ it has also clarified that commercial speech
nevertheless receives substantial protection.75
Indeed,
70. 155 CONG. REC. H6630 (daily ed. June 12, 2009) (statement of Rep. Paul), 155
Cong Rec H 6630, at *6655 (LEXIS).
71. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
72. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64 (1983); Linmark
Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91 (1977); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 759 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809, 822–25 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm‘n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384 (1973).
73. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
74. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985) (citing
Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 566); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1979).
75. Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L.
REV. 589, 591 (1996); see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass‘n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)
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commercial speech is vital to our society because it, ―not only
serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists
consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest
possible dissemination of information.‖76
Realizing the
importance of commercial speech protections, the Supreme
Court, in Central Hudson, articulated a four-prong analysis
under which courts can examine whether the First
Amendment protects a specific commercial expression.77
Because the specific provisions policing sports and
entertainment advertisements are regulations of commercial
speech, they must satisfy the requirements set forth in
Central Hudson to be considered constitutionally sound.78
A. Development of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
In Bigelow v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that it was
incorrect to assume that commercial speech lacked value in
the ―marketplace of ideas‖ or was not entitled to First
Amendment protection.79 One year later, in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., the Supreme Court expanded the Bigelow holding and
found that Virginia‘s overbroad ban on advertising the price
of prescription drugs violated the First Amendment.80 The
Court reasoned as follows:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may
seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what
price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be
made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter
of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be
intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of
commercial information is indispensable.81

The Court elaborated as follows:
(―[C]ommercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values.‖).
76. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Protection of Commercial Speech Under First
Amendment—Supreme Court Cases, 164 A.L.R. FED. 1, § 2 (2000).
77. Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 566.
78. Id.
79. 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975).
80. 425 U.S. 748, 759–61 (1976).
81. Id. at 765.
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There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic
approach. That alternative is to assume that this information is
not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best
interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best
means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather
than to close them.82

Subsequent Supreme Court decisions recognized that
commercial speech ―occurs in an area traditionally subject to
government regulation.‖83 Indeed, one commentator has
posited that ―[t]he entire commercial speech doctrine . . .
represents an accommodation between the right to speak and
hear expression about goods and services and the right of
government to regulate the sales of such goods and services.‖84
In acknowledging the ―distinction between speech
proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area
traditionally subject to government regulation, and other
varieties of speech,‖85 the Supreme Court promulgated a
framework for analyzing regulations of commercial speech
that is ―substantially similar‖ to the test for ―time, place, and
manner restrictions.‖86 The Supreme Court articulated this
analysis, the Central Hudson four prong test,87 as follows:
For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask
82. Id. at 770.
83. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass‘n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (citing Va. State Bd.
of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24).
84. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (alterations in
original) (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12–15, at
903 (2d ed. 1988)).
85. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–56).
86. Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989). This idea of ―time, place, and
manner restrictions‖ refers to the notion that ―[e]ven speech that enjoys the most
extensive First Amendment protection may be subject to ‗regulations of the time, place,
and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication.‘‖ HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-815, FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND PRESS: EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 16 (2009) (quoting Frisby
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988)).
87. In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court was tasked with considering a
regulation ―completely‖ prohibiting electrical utilities from engaging in promotional
advertising designed to stimulate demand for electricity. 447 U.S. at 558. Applying a
four-part inquiry, the Court found that although the state interest in conservation of
energy was substantial, and that there was ―an immediate connection between
advertising and demand for electricity,‖ the regulation was nevertheless invalid
because the commission failed to demonstrate that a more restrictive speech regulation
would not have adequately served the State‘s interest. Id. at 566, 569–71.
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whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted,
and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest.88

Indeed, the first prong concerns ―the informational
function of advertising‖—namely, under this prong, if the
communication does not ―accurately inform the public about
lawful activity,‖ it may be suppressed.89 Under the second
prong, if the speech is protected, the interest of the
government in regulating and limiting it must be assessed—
that is, the government ―must assert a substantial interest to
be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech.‖ 90 Under
the third prong, the restriction cannot be sustained ―if it
provides only ineffective or remote support for the [asserted]
purpose.‖91 Rather, the regulation must ―directly advance‖
the governmental interest asserted under the second prong.92
Finally, under the fourth prong, ―if the governmental interest
could be served as well by a more limited restriction on
commercial speech, [an] excessive restriction[] cannot
survive.‖93
Applying this framework in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and held
that a Rhode Island law prohibiting advertisement of the
price of alcohol ―in any manner whatsoever,‖ except by tags or
signs inside liquor stores, was impermissible under the First
Amendment.94
In applying the four-prong test, Justice
Stevens asserted that the first prong was satisfied because
―there [was] no question that Rhode Island‘s price advertising
ban constitute[d] a blanket prohibition against truthful,

88. Id. at 566.
89. Id. at 563.
90. Id. at 564.
91. Id.
92. Id.; see also United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 427 (1993)
(reiterating that ―this question cannot be answered by limiting the inquiry to whether
the governmental interest is directly advanced as applied to a single person or entity,‖
instead the court must look to the aggregate effects).
93. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. This prong has been altered by courts and
now instead of the ―least restrictive means‖ test, a court must find a ―reasonable fit‖
between means and ends, with the means ―narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective.‖ Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476–80 (1989).
94. 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996).
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nonmisleading speech about a lawful product.‖95
In
addressing the second prong, the Court conceded that the
government had a substantial interest in reducing alcohol
consumption.96 As for prong three, Justice Stevens asserted
that, ―speculation or conjecture‖ cannot ―suffice when the
State takes aim at accurate commercial information for
paternalistic ends.‖97 Indeed, Justice Stevens opined that,
―without any findings of fact, or . . . any evidentiary support
whatsoever, we cannot agree with the assertion that [a] price
advertising ban will significantly advance the State‘s interest
in promoting temperance.‖98 With regard to the fourth prong,
Justice Stevens found that Rhode Island had ―alternative
forms of regulation [available] that would not involve any
restriction on speech [and] would be more likely to achieve the
State‘s goal of promoting temperance.‖99 Such alternatives
included higher taxes, limited per capita purchases, and
educational campaigns.100 Consequently, the Court concluded
that ―even under the less than strict standard that generally
applies in commercial speech cases, the State has failed to
establish a ‗reasonable fit‘ between its abridgment of speech
and its temperance goal.‖101 This decision is important
because it provided guidance on future application of the
fourth prong of the Central Hudson test.
B. Central Hudson Analysis in the Tobacco Regulation
Context
The Supreme Court‘s opinion in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly102 is instructive in the tobacco regulation area. In that
case, the Supreme Court rejected a set of anti-tobacco
measures adopted by the State of Massachusetts designed to
limit the reach of tobacco-related advertisements on young
people.103 In Lorillard—as is the case with the Tobacco
Control Act—the purpose of the restrictions was to address
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 504.
Id.
Id. at 507 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993)).
Id. at 505.
Id. at 507.
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 507.
Id. (quoting Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
533 U.S. 525 (2001).
Id. at 562–63, 565–66.
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the access to and use of tobacco products by children under
the legal age.104 The Massachusetts regulation in question
prohibited outdoor advertising of tobacco products within
1000 feet of a school or playground.105 Evidence demonstrated
that the 1000-foot rule would effectively bar outdoor
advertising in as much as ninety-one percent of all land
located in the State‘s largest cities.106
In applying the Central Hudson analysis,107 the Court
focused on the last two prongs related to the ―relationship
between the harm that underlies the State‘s interest and the
means identified by the State to advance that interest.‖108 In
analyzing the third factor, Justice O‘Connor asserted that the
State had to demonstrate that its regulations advanced the
asserted regulatory interest and reiterated that ―mere
speculation or conjecture‖ was insufficient.109 Rather, the
State must ―demonstrate that the harms it recites are real
and that its restrictions will in fact alleviate them to a
material degree.‖110 The Court ultimately held, five to four, 111
that the State had met its burden under the third factor with
respect to the advertising restrictions related to the 1000-foot
rule for outdoor advertising.112
The Court, however,
determined that the Massachusetts restrictions conflicted
with the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test.113 The
effect of the 1000-foot rule would ―undoubtedly‖ vary from
place to place and such a ―uniformly broad sweep of the
geographical limitation demonstrate[d] a lack of tailoring.‖114
Notably, the Court also faulted the Massachusetts regulation
because it barred signs of all shapes and sizes rather than
104. Id. at 564.
105. Id. at 561–62.
106. Id. at 562.
107. Interestingly, the Court cursorily declined an invitation to apply strict scrutiny
to questions regarding commercial speech and to reject the Central Hudson framework.
See id. at 554–55. Commentators, however, opine that the standard employed in cases
such as Lorillard is ―intermediate scrutiny-plus.‖ See Conrad, supra note 4.
108. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 555.
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass‘n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173,
188 (1999)).
111. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O‘Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
represented the majority while Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
representing the dissenting opinions.
112. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 557–61.
113. Id. at 561.
114. Id. at 563.
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focusing on signs that might appeal to adolescents in
particular.115
Most recently, in Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United
States, plaintiffs claimed that various provisions of the
Tobacco Control Act violated their free speech rights under
the First Amendment, their Due Process rights under the
Fifth Amendment, and effected an unconstitutional taking
under the Fifth Amendment.116 Specifically, the plaintiffs
argued that the restrictions on the use of color and imagery,
brand-name event sponsorships, branded merchandise, and
bans on outdoor advertising violated several constitutional
provisions.117
In ruling on cross-motions for summary
judgment, the District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky began by noting that both parties agreed that the
Central Hudson framework is the appropriate test to apply
where the statute regulates commercial speech.118
Importantly, in Commonwealth Brands, the plaintiffs argued
that because Congress made no attempt to differentiate
between marketing practices directed at adults versus those
directed at children, the ban on brand-name sponsorships at
athletic, social, and cultural events was overly broad.119 In
support of this position, plaintiffs compared the MSA120 and
the Tobacco Control Act:
[W]hile the [MSA] permits ―specific types of brand name
sponsorships, including those in adult-only facilities like bars and
nightclubs,‖ the Act‘s ban on brand-name event sponsorship would
prohibit Lorillard‘s Newport Pleasure Draw blackjack tournament,
which, they argue, will not advance Congress‘s goal since that
tournament is ―restricted to adult smokers‖ and held in an ―adultonly facility‖ into which ―minors are not allowed to enter.‖121

Simply put, plaintiffs argued that ―because Congress could
have achieved its goal by restricting less speech . . . the Act‘s
ban is not narrowly tailored under Central Hudson.‖122
The court, however, rejected this contention and held that
115. Id.
116. 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010).
117. Id. at 521, 526.
118. Id. at 520.
119. Id. at 526.
120. For a detailed discussion of the MSA see supra Part II.A.
121. Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d at 526 (internal quotation
omitted).
122. Id.
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―the Act‘s ban is, in part, a reflection of Congress‘s view that
the MSA is inadequate‖ because the MSA provides ways for
tobacco manufacturers to ―successfully circumvent both the
ban on television cigarette advertising and the intent of the
[MSA] not to target youth.‖123 The court concluded by
asserting that ―[i]n light of this evidence, the [c]ourt believes
that there is a reasonable fit between the ends and the means
of the sponsorship ban.‖124
IV. APPLICATION OF THE CENTRAL HUDSON TEST TO THE
TOBACCO CONTROL ACT
As a threshold matter, the Tobacco Control Act was
seemingly drafted in anticipation of First Amendment
challenges
to
its
provisions
restricting
tobacco
advertisements. For instance, the Act seemingly addresses
the Central Hudson considerations by providing that:
(31) The regulations . . . will directly and materially advance the
Federal Government‘s substantial interest in reducing the number
of children and adolescents who use cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco and in preventing the life-threatening health consequences
associated with tobacco use . . . . Less restrictive and less
comprehensive approaches have not and will not be effective in
reducing the problems addressed by such regulations . . . .
(32) The regulations . . . impose no more extensive restrictions on
communication by tobacco manufacturers and sellers than are
necessary to reduce the number of children and adolescents who
use cigarettes and smokeless tobacco and to prevent the lifethreatening health consequences associated with tobacco use. Such
regulations are narrowly tailored to restrict those advertising and
promotional practices which are most likely to be seen or heard by
youth and most likely to entice them into tobacco use, while
affording tobacco manufacturers and sellers ample opportunity to
convey information about their products to adult consumers.125

Although the framers of the Tobacco Control Act
seemingly packed a Central Hudson analysis into its
provisions, this part will expressly apply the four-prong test
espoused in the preceding section to the Act in an attempt to
determine the likely outcome of a potential constitutional
123. Id. at 526–27.
124. Id. at 527.
125. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 11131, § 2(31)–(32), 123 Stat. 1776, 1779 (2009).
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challenge.
A. Lawful Activity and Substantial Government Interest
[Prongs One and Two]
As was the case in Lorillard, and many cases that
preceded it, the Tobacco Control Act can easily satisfy the
first two prongs of the Central Hudson analysis. Namely,
under the first prong, the inquiry is merely whether the
speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.126 If
the answer is no, the speech is not protected and may be
regulated without violating the First Amendment because
―there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public
about lawful activity.‖127 Conversely, if the answer is yes,
prong two of the test dictates that the speech may be
constitutionally regulated only if the government has a
substantial interest in regulating the speech.128 In this
instance, the speech restricted by the Tobacco Control Act is
entitled to First Amendment protection because it concerns
lawful activity and is not misleading, thereby satisfying prong
one; and second, the importance of the government‘s interest
in preventing use of tobacco-related products by minors is
irrefutable, thereby satisfying prong two. As the legislative
findings substantiate, there is a palpable interest in
preventing adolescent use of tobacco products, especially in
light of the staggering statistical data regarding such use. 129
In fact, every day more than 3500 adolescents try a cigarette
for the first time and another 1000 become new daily
smokers, with one-third of these youth eventually dying
prematurely as a result.130 As in other instances, ―the
Supreme Court has steadfastly upheld restrictions on the
First Amendment rights of children‖ aimed at their
protection.131
126. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 563 (1980).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 564.
129. § 2(14).
130. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act Is Necessary Federal
Legislation, NATIONAL NEWS (April 29, 2009), http://notobacco.wordpress.com/2009/04/
29/family-smoking-prevention-and-tobacco-control-act-is-necessary-federal-legislation/.
131. Leonard J. Nannarone, Move over Joe Camel: Governmental Attempts to Ban
Tobacco Advertising, 45 R.I. BUS. J. 11, 12 (1997).
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B. Determining Whether the Act Directly Advances the
Governmental Interest While Using the Most Restrictive
Means [Prongs Three and Four]
As with a great deal of case law discussing commercial
speech, the third and forth prongs of the Central Hudson test
are extremely fact-sensitive and must be examined cautiously
and oftentimes in conjunction with one another. As a
threshold matter, the Supreme Court has reiterated ―in
applying the third prong . . . courts should consider whether
the regulation, in its general application, directly advances
the governmental interest asserted.‖132 Indeed, as Justice
O‘Connor reminded in Lorillard, ―mere speculation or
conjecture‖ is insufficient, rather the government must
―demonstrate that the harms it recites are real.‖133 With
respect to the fourth prong of the Central Hudson analysis,
the government must demonstrate that the proposed
restrictions on advertising would have an impact on
adolescent smoking, and that the proposed restrictions are
sufficiently tailored to preclude unnecessary intrusions on
expressive freedom. To be sure, although the fourth prong
does not explicitly require the government to adopt the
precise method that advances regulatory objectives while
simultaneously imposing the fewest speech restrictions, the
means chosen must nonetheless be ―narrowly tailored.‖134
C. Analysis and Proposed Amendment
In the legislative findings incorporated in the Tobacco
Control Act, Congress has illustrated that there is not only a
substantial government interest at stake but—statistically
speaking—tobacco-related promotional efforts do in fact
coincide with increases in adolescent tobacco use.135 As a
result of these findings, it seems likely that the restrictions in
the Act would directly advance the governmental interest in
curbing adolescent tobacco use, thus satisfying the third
132. COHEN, supra note 86, at 7 (citing United States v. Edge Broad., 509 U.S. 418,
427 (1993)).
133. Id. at 8 (quoting Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass‘n v. United States, 527 U.S.
173, 188 (1999)).
134. Bd. Of Trs. v. Fox, 192 U.S. 469, 477–78 (1989).
135. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 11131, § 2(5), (15), 123 Stat. 1776, 1777–78 (2009).
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prong of Central Hudson.
These restrictions, however, are simply too broad to satisfy
the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test.136 To be sure,
although there is a substantial government interest at stake,
the provisions espoused in the Tobacco Control Act,
restricting the means by which tobacco sponsors may
advertise at sports and entertainment events are not
sufficiently tailored to achieve the Act‘s purpose. As the
Court in Lorillard warned:
The State‘s interest in preventing underage tobacco use is
substantial, and even compelling, but it is no less true that the sale
and use of tobacco products by adults is a legal activity. We must
consider that tobacco retailers and manufacturers have an interest
in conveying truthful information about tobacco products. . . . As
the State protects children from tobacco advertisements, tobacco
manufacturers and retailers and their adult consumers still have a
protected interest in communication.137

Similarly, Representative Stephen Buyer‘s argument
during the enactment of the Tobacco Control Act is
illustrative in this instance. There, he opined, ―[c]hildren
deserve to be protected from inappropriate or harmful
material, but the government may not use the guise of
protecting children to impose sweeping restrictions on
information intended for adults.‖138 One cannot simply call
the Tobacco Control Act constitutionally sound merely
because there is a tangible interest in protecting children
from tobacco-related products. As the Court reminded in
Butler v. Michigan, the government may not ―reduce the adult
population . . . to reading only what was fit for children.‖139
136. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561 (2001). Similarly,
the fourth prong cannot be satisfied because the means implemented by Congress
under this Act failed to exhaust other means to curb adolescent tobacco use. As
discussed above, the 111th Congress‘s primary goal in promulgating the Tobacco
Control Act was to reduce the sale and use of tobacco by specifically focusing on the sale
of tobacco products to adolescents under eighteen. To achieve that end, however, rather
than imposing a tax or sales restrictions on the retailing of tobacco products, the
government has specifically attacked speech-related activities. The Supreme Court,
however, has clarified that the Constitution requires that such restrictions on truthfulspeech be implemented solely as a last resort. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr.,
535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002).
137. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 564.
138. 155 CONG. REC. H6630 (daily ed. June 12, 2009) (statement of Rep. Buyer),
155 Cong. Rec. H 6630, at *6657 (LEXIS).
139. 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). Accord Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S.
60, 74 (1983) (―The level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to

WIGGINTON_TOBACCO ADVERTISING.DOC

2011]

Tobacco Advertising out for Good?

7/29/2011 11:01 AM

557

A review of the case law developed in the preceding part
reveals that the Supreme Court has consistently struck down
restrictions on speech that were significantly more limited in
scope than the Tobacco Control Act. For instance, in Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co., the Supreme Court invalidated a
prohibition against listing alcohol content on beer labels, even
though beer manufacturers were permitted to convey the
same information to consumers via other channels.140
Similarly, in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., the
Supreme Court struck down restrictions on placing
commercial handbills in news racks on city streets, even
though publishers had numerous other means of distributing
their handbills.141 Lastly, in Bolger v. Young Drug Products
Corp., the Supreme Court struck down a ban on direct-mail
advertising of contraceptives, even though manufacturers still
had numerous other methods available to advertise their
products.142 In conjunction with the Lorillard decision, the
case law cited above supports the proposition that the
sweeping speech-related prohibitions espoused in the Tobacco
Control Act simply cannot be deemed constitutional in light of
Congress‘s failure to demonstrate that these restrictions are
the least restrictive means of decreasing adolescent tobacco
use. Indeed, as one commentator has noted, ―a widespread
ban [cannot] be justified on the grounds that it is designed to
insulate minors from tobacco advertising.‖143
Simply put, the speech restrictions contained in the
Tobacco Control Act prohibiting the use of any tobacco brand
names at any cultural, sporting, charitable or other event are
too expansive, and can be seen as nothing more than an
attempt by Congress to ―burn the house to roast the pig.‖144
In order to be constitutionally sound, Congress should tailor
the speech restrictions to those events that have a particular
appeal to children. To be sure, the Tobacco Control Act as it
stands today would ban tobacco advertisements and
sponsorships from activities ranging from the opera to beach
volleyball. Certainly, Congress cannot argue that an absolute
ban on tobacco advertisements at these events is
that which would be suitable for a sandbox.‖).
140. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
141. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
142. 463 U.S. 60.
143. Redish, supra note 75, at 593.
144. Butler, 352 U.S. at 383.
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constitutionally feasible because of the fact that children may
attend these events.145
A more narrowly tailored approach to restricting tobacco
advertisements would be to ban the posting of such
advertisements in the camera‘s view at sports and
entertainment events aired on television, thus decreasing
children‘s exposure.
Not surprisingly, statistical data
illustrates that a greater percentage of the population
watches sporting events on television as opposed to attending
the actual events.146 Indeed, in 2009, the Los Angeles
Dodgers reported the highest total MLB attendance for the
season with 3,761,669 fans attending its games—all season.147
Compare that with the 106,500,000 viewers that reportedly
watched the Super Bowl on their television this year.148 The
government, in this instance, is undoubtedly implementing a
restriction that is unduly prejudicial to the adult attendees
and the sports and entertainment sponsors if—statistically
speaking—the number of adult attendees far exceeds that of
attendees under the age of eighteen. Clearly, a restriction on
the tobacco advertisements aired on television would more
appropriately address Congress‘s concern with adolescent
exposure to tobacco-related advertisements at these events.
Notably, the Tobacco Control Act seeks to prevent tobaccorelated advertisements at the following sporting events:
football, baseball, basketball, soccer, and hockey, 149 which
represent the five sports most watched by teens on television.
To be sure: approximately twenty-one percent of teens
between the ages of twelve and eighteen reported watching
football at least one time per month; approximately seventeen
percent of teens reported watching basketball at least one
time per month; approximately fifteen percent of teens
145. Although Congress attempted to address concerns of the speech-restrictions
expansive reach by positing that even a single exposure by a child to tobacco-related
advertising is effective in promoting tobacco-use, the Act fails to provide statistical data
in support of this proposition.
146. 2009 MRI (Mediamark Research & Intelligence) Teenmark; Weighted by
Population; Copyright © 2009, MRI All Rights Reserved [hereinafter Athletics
Viewership] (on file with author).
147. MLB 2009 Attendance Report, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/mlb/attendance/_/year/
2009 (last visited Mar. 31, 2011)
148. Paul Kennedy, Good and Bad News for Soccer, SOCCER AM. DAILY (Nov. 24,
2010), http://www.socceramerica.com/article/40537/good-and-bad-news-for-soccer.html.
149. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-31, § 102, 123 Stat. 1776, 1830–33 (2009).

WIGGINTON_TOBACCO ADVERTISING.DOC

2011]

Tobacco Advertising out for Good?

7/29/2011 11:01 AM

559

reported watching baseball at least one time per month;
approximately seven percent of teens reported watching
soccer at least one time per month; and approximately five
percent of teens reported watching ice hockey at least one
time per month.150 As a result of these findings, to achieve
the government‘s goal of reducing the amount of youth
smokers while curing this constitutional infirmity, Congress
should amend the Tobacco Control Act to provide that only
sports watched by more than ten percent of teens at least once
per month should not have any tobacco-related
advertisements visible during the entirety of the sporting
event.
To be sure, a review of the statistics above
demonstrates that the sports that are watched by more than
ten percent of teens at least once a month are football,
baseball, and basketball.
As such, any tobacco-related
advertisements allowed at sports‘ stadiums or events should
be out of the camera‘s view so that the children are not
exposed to these advertisements while watching their favorite
pastimes. Notably, this was the Justice Department‘s goal in
1995 when they filed a federal suit against Philip Morris
―charg[ing] that the premium placement of Marlboro signs [in
camera view] was designed to circumvent a twenty-four-yearold ban on television cigarette advertising.‖151 Consequently,
―department officials said they hoped [they would reach an]
agreement [that] would prod other tobacco companies into
moving their ads out of camera range.‖152
Although the proposal above would still allow tobaccorelated advertisements to be posted in appropriate areas at
sporting events, Congress should maintain an absolute ban on
advertisements at other activities commonly attended by
children. For example, Congress should maintain an absolute
ban on tobacco-related advertisements at activities geared
toward adolescent attendance such as zoos and arcades. An
ancillary issue that narrower future legislation needs to
address should be the idea that children who idolize athletes
and performers should not be able to see these tobacco images
associated with such role models.
Utilizing a more systematic approach to regulating tobacco
advertisements aimed toward an actual adolescent
150. Athletics Viewership, supra note 146.
151. Sandomir, supra note 62.
152. Id.
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attendance would help alleviate the potentially prejudicial
effects adult attendees and sports and entertainment
sponsors suffer while simultaneously effectuating the
government‘s interest in protecting the youth from an
onslaught of tobacco advertisements at sports and
entertainment events.
CONCLUSION
Although the Tobacco Control Act expressly states that it
will only develop regulations to the extent permitted by the
First Amendment,153 the likelihood of a constitutional
challenge to the Act, on the ground that it violates commercial
speech rights, is palpable.154 As is the case with a great deal
of anti-tobacco legislation that preceded the Tobacco Control
Act, it is essential to keep in mind that while the goal of
curbing adolescent tobacco use is certainly a noble endeavor,
the constitutional protections afforded to citizens of the
United States remain paramount. The recently enacted
Tobacco Control Act purports to reduce adolescent‘s access to
tobacco products and to diminish the appeal of these products
to the youth;155 however, the Act provides a blanket ban on
not only the distribution of tobacco products at all sports and
entertainment
events
but
explicitly
bars
tobacco
manufacturers from promoting their brands through
sponsorships of ―athletic, musical, artistic, or other social or
cultural event[s].‖156
Importantly, these provisions regulating sports and
153. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-31, § 2(30)–(32), 123 Stat. 1776, 1778–79 (2009); see also David Waldman, Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act: Daily Whip Line, CONGRESS MATTERS
(June 12, 2009, 8:00 AM), http://www.congressmatters.com/storyonly/2009/6/12/1114/Family-Smoking-Prevention-and-Tobacco-Control-Act (―FDA would have authority to
develop regulations that restrict the advertising and promotion of a tobacco product
consistent with, and to the full extent permitted by, the [F]irst [A]mendment to the
Constitution.‖).
154. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 10 (―The Association of National Advertisers says
the act‘s ‗unprecedentedly broad advertising restrictions‘ violate First Amendment
protections for commercial speech. Legal experts say a court challenge on that ground
is virtually certain.‖); TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, supra note 7, at 2
(―[T]he judicial system will almost certainly be asked to adjudicate whether any of the
legislated advertising restrictions unconstitutionally interferes with free speech under
the First Amendment.‖).
155. Press Release, supra note 21.
156. 21 C.F.R. § 1140.34(c) (2010).
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entertainment advertisements are considered regulations of
―commercial speech.‖ To be sure, the United States Supreme
Court has repeatedly accepted that such speech falls within
the ambit of the First Amendment.157
Realizing the
importance of commercial speech protections, in Central
Hudson, the Supreme Court espoused a four-prong analysis
under which courts can examine whether a specific regulation
of commercial speech is an unconstitutional encroachment on
the First Amendment.158 Under this analytical framework,
the court must first determine whether the expression at
issue concerns lawful activity that is not deceptive or
misleading.159
Namely, under this prong if the
communication does not accurately inform the public about
lawful activity it may be suppressed. 160 Second, the Court
must ask whether the interest of the government in
regulating and limiting the expression is substantial.161
Third, the Court must determine whether the regulation
proposed by the government directly advances the
governmental interest.162 Lastly, the Court must examine
whether a more limited restriction on commercial speech
could serve the governmental interest.163
In applying the Central Hudson test to the Tobacco
Control Act, it is immediately evident that the first two
prongs can be satisfied. Indeed, the speech sought to be
regulated under the Act is lawful and not misleading and
there is certainly a substantial governmental interest at stake
in curbing adolescent‘s access to and use of tobacco products.
Similarly, the third prong of the Central Hudson analysis can
be satisfied because, as the legislative findings to the Act
illustrate, there is a strong correlation between the
advertising and promotional efforts of tobacco products and
adolescent tobacco use.164
Lastly, however, because the
Tobacco Control Act provides for a blanket ban on tobacco157. See infra, Part III.
158. Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
159. Id. at 563
160. Id.
161. Id. at 564
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 11131, § 2(14), 123 Stat. 1776, 1777 (2009).
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related advertisements at a plethora of sports and
entertainment events, the government would not be able to
demonstrate that its interest could not be served just as well
by a having more limited restrictions on commercial speech.
To cure this constitutional infirmity, the Tobacco Control
Act should ban only those tobacco-related advertisements that
television viewers of sports and entertainment events can see.
Undeniably,
more people—especially
adolescents—are
watching sports on television than attending actual sporting
events. Consequently, if the true aim of the Tobacco Control
Act is to curb adolescent tobacco use by restricting the
advertisements they are exposed to, a ban on advertisements
outside of the purview of the camera would serve as the least
restrictive means of effectuating the government‘s interest.
Simply put, because the speech restrictions contained in the
Tobacco Control Act are too expansive, Congress should tailor
them to ensure that the government‘s interest in reducing
child tobacco use is directly advanced while simultaneously
maintaining the rights of adult viewers and tobacco sponsors.

